



bcuc
British Columbia
Utilities Commission

Patrick Wruck
Commission Secretary

Commission.Secretary@bcuc.com
bcuc.com

Suite 410, 900 Howe Street
Vancouver, BC Canada V6Z 2N3
P: 604.660.4700
TF: 1.800.663.1385
F: 604.660.1102

August 31, 2017

Sent via eFile

FEI 2016 RATE DESIGN

EXHIBIT A2-16

To: All Registered Parties

Re: FortisBC Energy Inc. – 2016 Rate Design Application – Project No. 3698899 – Elenchus Research Associates, Inc. Response to Information Request No. 2

Commission staff submit the following document for the record in this proceeding:

Elenchus Research Associates, Inc.
Response to Commercial Energy Consumers Association of BC
Information Request on Rate Design Report dated August 31, 2017

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Patrick Wruck
Commission Secretary

ES/kbb
Enclosure

1 **19.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page ii and page 6**

2 1. Rate shock

- 3 • There are no generally accepted principles that provide clear guidance to
4 regulators for defining rate increases that constitute rate shock.
- 5 • Whenever a customer class is faced with a large rate increase, it is
6 reasonable for a regulator to consider whether the increase will result in
7 sufficient rate shock for customers in the class to warrant some form of
8 mitigation.
- 9 • While many utilities and regulatory agencies have no established method
10 for quantifying rate shock, at least two Canadian regulators of natural gas
11 utilities do address the issue of rate shock using an established and
12 consistent methodology.
- 13 • Elenchus has observed that a common threshold for defining a rate/bill
14 increase that constitutes rate shock is a double-digit increase (i.e., greater
15 than 10%).

16 For electricity distributors, the OEB has a policy requiring the filing of a
17 mitigation plan when the total bill impact is 10% or more for any customer class.
18 The OEB expects all other utilities to propose mitigation plans, or explain why a
19 plan is not required, when their proposals result in material impacts to
20 customers.

21 The AUC considers the overall change in total customer bills when applying the
22 10% threshold as the potential rate shock indicator.

23 19.1 Are there regulators in the US of which Elenchus is aware that address
24 the issue of rate shock using an established or consistent methodology
25 and thresholds employed? If so, please provide the names of regulator, its
26 jurisdiction and the methodology and thresholds employed.

27 **RESPONSE:**

28 Elenchus is not aware of US regulators that employ established or consistent
29 methodologies and thresholds to address rate shock.

1 **20.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 7**

2 The first concept of fairness relates to the absolute level of rates. The rates
3 implied by a regulator's analytic findings with respect to a utility's revenue
4 requirement, cost allocation and rate design, taking into account all
5 considerations other than rate shock will, by definition, be rates that are fair and
6 equitable in terms of the share of costs recovered from each class and from
7 individual customers within each class.

8 The second concept of fairness relates to the rate of change in rates, or more
9 importantly the change in a customer's average monthly bill, as a result of the
10 justified rate changes. In many circumstances, a significant increase in customer
11 bills can result in real or perceived hardship for customers that are sufficiently
12 severe that the increase is considered inequitable. This inequity may justify
13 moderating the impact on customers by reducing the increase that would
14 otherwise be implemented, although the necessary consequence is that some
15 other customers will have higher rates than would have been required in the
16 absence of the mitigation of rate shock for the customers with the largest
17 increases.

18 20.1 Please confirm that rates already found 'fair and equitable' by regulators
19 may be adjusted by regulators and still be 'fair and equitable' even if there
20 has been no change in the cost structure.

21 20.1.1 If not confirmed, please explain why not.

22 **RESPONSE:**

23 Confirmed.

1 **20.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 7**

2 The first concept of fairness relates to the absolute level of rates. The rates
3 implied by a regulator's analytic findings with respect to a utility's revenue
4 requirement, cost allocation and rate design, taking into account all
5 considerations other than rate shock will, by definition, be rates that are fair and
6 equitable in terms of the share of costs recovered from each class and from
7 individual customers within each class.

8 The second concept of fairness relates to the rate of change in rates, or more
9 importantly the change in a customer's average monthly bill, as a result of the
10 justified rate changes. In many circumstances, a significant increase in customer
11 bills can result in real or perceived hardship for customers that are sufficiently
12 severe that the increase is considered inequitable. This inequity may justify
13 moderating the impact on customers by reducing the increase that would
14 otherwise be implemented, although the necessary consequence is that some
15 other customers will have higher rates than would have been required in the
16 absence of the mitigation of rate shock for the customers with the largest
17 increases.

18 20.2 Please confirm that the existence of rate shock does not preclude the
19 Commission from addressing other considerations and balancing these
20 considerations against the bill impacts.

21 **RESPONSE:**

22 Confirmed.

1 **21.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 8**

2 Elenchus has observed that a common threshold for defining a rate/bill increase
3 that constitutes rate shock is a double-digit increase (i.e., 10% or more). This
4 view of rate shock appears to be more reflective of perceived societal values
5 than any analytic basis for defining undue hardship resulting from a rate
6 increase. Indeed, the hardship resulting from a rate increase is more closely
7 correlated to income than the rate increase itself. Further, since customers tend
8 to focus on the change in their total bills, rather than changes in individual
9 components of the bill, it is typical, and in the view of Elenchus more appropriate,
10 to define rate shock in terms of the increase in the total bill.

11 21.1 Please confirm that a 10% rate increase does not in and of itself constitute
12 rate shock, and that the percentage rate increase should reasonably be
13 evaluated along with other issues such as the actual increase when the
14 Commission evaluates the existence of rate shock.

15 21.1.1 If not confirmed, please explain why not.

16 **RESPONSE:**

17 Confirmed.

1 **22.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 9**

2 FEI's proposed rates for all rate classes are within the 10% rate increase
3 threshold. Furthermore, FEI's approach as indicated in the Procedural
4 Conference dated April 5, 2017, appears to be consistent with the approach that
5 has been accepted in other jurisdictions.

6 22.1. Is Elenchus referring to the OEB and the AUC as the 'other jurisdictions'?

7 22.1.1. If not, please identify the 'other jurisdictions' to which Elenchus is
8 referring.

9 **RESPONSE:**

10 Among the utilities reviewed by Elenchus, Ontario and Alberta are the “other
11 jurisdictions” that provide quantified rate increase threshold.

1 **23.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 10 and 11 and page 13**

2 charge. It is common for utilities to also recover some portion of customer-related
3 costs through the volumetric charge, presumably with the rationale that the
4 volumetric charge is a proxy for the value of service to customers. Maintaining a
5 low fixed basic monthly charge also serves to maintain customer connections
6 even for customers with low demand.

7 This approach is consistent with the marginal cost of serving connected
8 customers (i.e., it is financially beneficial for a utility to encourage connected
9 customers to continue to take service, even if their volume is minimal, and avoid
10 having them discontinue natural gas service). Nevertheless, there appears to be
11 a trend toward recovering a larger proportion of customer-related costs through
12 the monthly basic charge, which improves equity as measured by fully allocated
13 costs.

14 Conceptually, cost allocation principles imply that to reflect cost causality the
15 fixed charge should mirror customer-related costs as identified in the cost
16 allocation model, while variable energy and demand charges should reflect
17 energy and demand-related costs. Nevertheless, rate-setting is also often
18 influenced by value of service considerations that result in a lower fixed charge
19 which keeps bills down for customers with below average demand. This
20 approach can encourage increased penetration in terms of the number of
21 customers connected although this is arguably accomplished by embedding a
22 cross-subsidy of low-volume users by the higher volume users in the same rate
23 class.

24 23.1 Please confirm that 'value to customers' is covered by the Bonbright
25 principle for efficient pricing, and if not, please describe how it fits into
26 Bonbright Principles.

27 **RESPONSE:**

28 Confirmed.

1 **24.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 14**

2 There appears to be two primary reasons for utilities not recovering their fixed
3 costs through fixed charges:

- 4 1. Doing so may result in rate shock to customers' bills.
5 2. This approach may run counter to a Government policy objective of
6 encouraging conservation.

7 Alternatives to FEI's one time 5% increase proposals could include:

- 8 • No one-time increase
9 • One time 5% increase and subsequent annual adjustments to the fixed
10 change(s)
11 • One time increase greater than 5%

12 These are commented on in the following subsections.

13 24.1 Please confirm that another reasonable option would be a one-time
14 increase of a lower amount (eg 2%) with subsequent increases to the
15 fixed charge or multiple increases of different sizes.

16 24.1.1 If not confirmed, please explain why not.

17 24.1.1.1 If confirmed, please also confirm or otherwise explain
18 that the advantages of such a proposal would be a
19 directional improvement in cost/cost causation,
20 directional improvement in the ability for FEI to recover its
21 costs, and minimization of rate impacts.

22 24.1.2 If confirmed please also confirm or otherwise explain that the
23 disadvantages of such a proposal would be that the improvement in
24 cost/cost causation and the ability for FEI to recover its costs would
25 be delayed vis a vis the alternative.

26 **RESPONSE:**

27 24.1 Confirmed.

28 24.1.1.1 Confirmed.

29 24.1.2 Confirmed.

1 **25.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 9 and page 14 and page 15**

2 FEI is proposing a one-time 5% increase to fixed daily basic charge and
3 corresponding decrease in the volumetric delivery charge. This type of changes
4 is typically referred to as a change in the fixed-variable split. As indicated in the
5 delivery cost COSA model.

6 The benefits of no one-time increase are that it would eliminate potential bill
7 impacts for low-use customers and it would be consistent with Government policy
8 of encouraging customers to reduce their consumption of natural gas.

9 The disadvantages of no one-time increase are that fixed charges billed to
10 customers will deviate further from the fixed costs imposed by customers on the
11 utility and a larger proportion of fixed costs would be recovered through the
12 variable charge resulting in more uncertainty to the utility of recovering its
13 approved revenue requirement. In addition, keeping a higher variable charge is a
14 disincentive for the utility to maximize the effectiveness of its conservation
15 programs.

16 25 Please confirm that the advantages of an increased in fixed charges
17 include improved cost/cost causation relationships within the rate class.

18 **RESPONSE:**

19 Confirmed.

1 **25.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 9 and page 14 and page 15**

2 FEI is proposing a one-time 5% increase to fixed daily basic charge and
3 corresponding decrease in the volumetric delivery charge. This type of changes
4 is typically referred to as a change in the fixed-variable split. As indicated in the
5 delivery cost COSA model.

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7 impacts for low-use customers and it would be consistent with Government policy
8 of encouraging customers to reduce their consumption of natural gas.

9 The disadvantages of no one-time increase are that fixed charges billed to
10 customers will deviate further from the fixed costs imposed by customers on the
11 utility and a larger proportion of fixed costs would be recovered through the
12 variable charge resulting in more uncertainty to the utility of recovering its
13 approved revenue requirement. In addition, keeping a higher variable charge is a
14 disincentive for the utility to maximize the effectiveness of its conservation
15 programs.

16 25.1 Please confirm that the disadvantage of no increase also include ongoing
17 subsidization of lower volume customers by higher volume customers.

18 **RESPONSE:**

19 Confirmed (within the same customer class), assuming a portion of customer related
20 costs are being recovered by the variable rate.

1 **25.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 9 and page 14 and page 15**

2 FEI is proposing a one-time 5% increase to fixed daily basic charge and
3 corresponding decrease in the volumetric delivery charge. This type of changes
4 is typically referred to as a change in the fixed-variable split. As indicated in the
5 delivery cost COSA model.

6 The benefits of no one-time increase are that it would eliminate potential bill
7 impacts for low-use customers and it would be consistent with Government policy
8 of encouraging customers to reduce their consumption of natural gas.

9 The disadvantages of no one-time increase are that fixed charges billed to
10 customers will deviate further from the fixed costs imposed by customers on the
11 utility and a larger proportion of fixed costs would be recovered through the
12 variable charge resulting in more uncertainty to the utility of recovering its
13 approved revenue requirement. In addition, keeping a higher variable charge is a
14 disincentive for the utility to maximize the effectiveness of its conservation
15 programs.

16 25.2 Please elaborate on the uncertainty FEI could experience in recovering its
17 approved revenue requirement due to having a higher proportion of fixed
18 costs recovered through the variable charge.

19 **RESPONSE:**

20 Assuming the variable charge is used to recover a portion of fixed costs, variable
21 charges are applied to volume of natural gas consumed. Volume of natural gas
22 consumed is weather dependent, so the utility would be at risk of under or over
23 recovering its revenue requirement under abnormal weather conditions, absent a true
24 up mechanism that may exist to keep the utility whole. Fixed charges are not weather
25 dependent and the utility is assured of recovery of the revenue requirement reflected in
26 the fixed charges.

27 25.2.1 Please explain how this uncertainty is affected by PBR and by cost
28 of service ratemaking.

29 **RESPONSE:**

30 Usually under PBR and under cost of service proceedings, the issue of fixed versus
31 variable rates are not dealt with, so the utility uncertainty with respect to the impact of
32 weather on the recovery of its approved revenue requirement is not addressed. Some
33 PBR regimes include mechanisms, such as a Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism

34 (LRAM), that adjust rates to address lost revenue due to declining volume. For example,
35 LRAMs have been adopted by the OEB to address the disincentive that otherwise exists
36 for utilities to underachieve in realizing efficiency gains.

37 Fixed versus variable rates are usually addressed during rate design proceedings that
38 may or may not be part of cost of service applications.

1 **26.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 15 and page 16**

2 3.2.2.3 *MORE THAN 5% ONE TIME INCREASE*

3 Taking into consideration potential rate shock to customers, especially low
4 use customers, another alternative to FEI's one time 5% increase is to
5 increase the fixed charge by more than 5% based on what is considered
6 to be the maximum tolerable bill impact for low use customers. Low use
7 customer could be a customer that used natural gas only for cooking, for
8 example. A 5% increase in the fixed distribution charge will result in a
9 smaller percentage increase in total customer bills after commodity and
10 transportation charges are taking into consideration.

11 The benefit of this alternative is that it will allow the utility to recover a
12 larger proportion of its fixed costs from the fixed charge and better align
13 fixed charges with fixed costs.

14 The disadvantage of this alternative is that it runs counter to Government
15 objective of encouraging conservation by increasing fixed charges and
16 reducing variable charges sending the opposite price signal to customers
17 that reduced energy consumption results in lower customer bills.

18 26.1 Please confirm that the benefit of aligning fixed charges with fixed costs is
19 primarily one of improved fairness related to cost causation.

20 **RESPONSE:**

21 Confirmed.

1 **27.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 16**

2 Elenchus notes that increases in the fixed monthly charge in excess of 5% have
3 been common in the Ontario electricity sector; however, these increases have
4 been the direct result of the OEB's policy decision to require all distributors to
5 transition to a fully fixed distribution charge. In addition, large percentage
6 increases in fixed charges are common in cases where utilities have a relatively
7 low basic monthly charge and increase the charge by a relatively small dollar
8 amount, especially in cases where the utility maintains a rounded amount (for
9 example, an increase from \$20 to \$25 would constitute a 25% increase but would
10 typically not be considered to result in rate shock).

11 27.1 Please elaborate on why the 25% increase discussed above would not be
12 considered to result in rate shock.

13 **RESPONSE:**

14 In Ontario it is considered that a \$3 to \$5 increase in a customer's total bill would not be
15 considered rate shock, even if it would represent a larger than 10% increase in the
16 customer's total bill. This would be based on the fact that the current bill does not
17 reflect cost causality as determined by a COSA study.

1 **28.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 20**

2 Specifically, AltaGas excluded the gas cost recovery charge when calculating the
3 cross over point between small and large general service classes, which is
4 different from the method used by FEI.

5 4.3 ELENCHUS ANALYSIS

6 It is noted that the gas cost recovery charge is collected through a rider at
7 the same rate for small and large general service customers served by
8 AltaGas, which means that the economic crossover volume is the same
9 whether the commodity cost is included in or excluded from the
10 calculation. However, this is not the case for FEI where different
11 commodity costs exist for small and large commercial customers. The
12 difference is due to the different method of regulating gas costs. For Alta
13 Gas, gas costs are excluded from the cost of service study and are
14 recovered by a monthly rider applied to all sales service rates unless
15 otherwise specified to ensure that customers pay neither more nor less
16 than the actual costs. For FEI, the commodity component of the gas cost
17 is allocated to customers based on throughput while storage and transport
18 components are allocated using the load factor adjusted volumetric basis.

19 It is common practice to recover commodity costs in a separate
20 commodity rate; hence, commodity costs will not have an impact on the
21 cross-over volume. Excluding commodity costs therefore simplifies the
22 calculation with no loss of information.

23 28.1 Please provide Elenchus' view of FEI's allocation of the commodity
24 component of the gas cost based on throughput.

25 **RESPONSE:**

26 Elenchus agrees with the allocation methodology of commodity gas costs to FEI's
27 customers. Commodity gas costs are a flow through cost for FEI sales customers and
28 depend on the amount of natural gas used by sales customers, therefore energy is the
29 allocator to use that reflects cost causality.

1 **29.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 21 and 22 and 25**

2 5.2 INDUSTRY PRACTICE

- 3 • *A review of the benefits/disadvantages of requiring a minimum load*
4 *factor to qualify for a specific rate for industrial rate classes*
5 ○ *What is a typical minimum load factor used in other*
6 *jurisdictions, if any?*
7 ○ *An explanation of the benefits/disadvantages of different*
8 *load factor levels.*

9 FEI does not have a minimum load factor requirement for the industrial rate
10 classes and it is not proposing to introduce a minimum load factor although many
11 other natural gas distributors do have a minimum load factor.

12 There are four utilities in the jurisdictional review that require a minimum load
13 factor to qualify for specified industrial rate, which is one method that can be
14 used to provide high load factor customers with lower rates that are reflective of
15 their lower causal costs relative to volume. Table 2 below summaries the load
16 factors requirements.

17 Higher load factor customers are less expensive to serve on a volumetric basis
18 than lower load factor customers since they require less distribution capacity,
19 less storage for load balancing and/or less upstream transportation for a given
20 volume of natural gas. Consequently, lower rates are justified for higher load
21 factor customers unless the rate structure consists of customer, demand and
22 energy rates that correspond closely to the corresponding costs drivers.

23 However, Elenchus notes that the effects of a minimum load factor can be quite
24 complex. For example, Enbridge proposed to lower the load factor requirement
25 from 50% to 40% under Large Volume Load Factor in proceeding EB-2012-0459.
26 It was stated that the reason for lowering the load factor requirement was based
27 on two concerns:

- 28 • To facilitate continuity of service under this rate for customers who
29 implement energy efficiency measures; and
30 • To provide a choice for general service customers with load factors
31 greater than 40% to take service under this rate.

32 29.1 Would it be reasonable for FEI to introduce a minimum load factor?
33 Please explain why or why not.

34 **RESPONSE:**

35 Elenchus agrees with EES Consulting that since FEI's industrial rates include a demand
36 charge that already takes into account differing load factors by rate group, as a result,
37 load factor is not necessary to segment customers even further in the industrial rate
38 group.

1 **29.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 21 and 22 and 25**

2 5.2 INDUSTRY PRACTICE

- 3 • *A review of the benefits/disadvantages of requiring a minimum load*
4 *factor to qualify for a specific rate for industrial rate classes*
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10 classes and it is not proposing to introduce a minimum load factor although many
11 other natural gas distributors do have a minimum load factor.

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20 volume of natural gas. Consequently, lower rates are justified for higher load
21 factor customers unless the rate structure consists of customer, demand and
22 energy rates that correspond closely to the corresponding costs drivers.

23 However, Elenchus notes that the effects of a minimum load factor can be quite
24 complex. For example, Enbridge proposed to lower the load factor requirement
25 from 50% to 40% under Large Volume Load Factor in proceeding EB-2012-0459.
26 It was stated that the reason for lowering the load factor requirement was based
27 on two concerns:

- 28 • To facilitate continuity of service under this rate for customers who
29 implement energy efficiency measures; and
30 • To provide a choice for general service customers with load factors
31 greater than 40% to take service under this rate.

32 29.2 Please provide Elenchus' views as to any impact that would likely arise
33 from the introduction of a minimum load factor.

34 **RESPONSE:**

35 The introduction of a minimum load factor as a new criteria to be classified into a rate
36 class can cause customers to have to be reclassified into a different customer class, if
37 they do not meet the new minimum load factor requirement. This would impact the
38 utility's customer classification, utility's billing process and customer understanding and
39 acceptance of the new minimum load factor requirement and the resulting customer
40 reclassification. It may also have bill impact for the customer resulting from the
41 reclassification that are related to differences other than the load factor differences that
42 are addressed by demand charges (e.g., the subclasses may have other cost
43 difference, in which case it would be preferable to base subclasses on the more
44 relevant cost factors, such as annual volume or peak demand).

1 **30.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 33**Table 4: R:C Ratio Range of Reasonableness

Utility	Range of Reasonableness
AltaGas ⁶¹	95% to 105%
ATCO ⁶²	95% to 105%
Union Gas ⁶³	Close to unity ⁶⁴
Enbridge ⁶⁵	Close to unity
Centra Gas ⁶⁶	100%
SaskEnergy ⁶⁷	95% to 105%

⁶¹ AUC Decision 2014-139 (May 23, 2014), page 17.

⁶² EUB Decision 2006-062 (June 27, 2006), page 3.

⁶³ OEB EB-2011-0210, Decision and Order, page 81.

⁶⁴ Elenchus interprets "Close to unity" as a smaller range than 95% to 105%.

⁶⁵ OEB Order EB-2012-0459, page 6 of 63.

⁶⁶ Centra Gas Manitoba Inc. 2013/14 General Rate Application, Appendix 15.2, page 2 of 5.

⁶⁷ SaskEnergy Incorporated Rate Application - 2016, slide 19.

⁶⁸ Exhibit B-1. Section 6, page 6.34, lines 22 to 23

2

3 30.1 In some cases following up on the above did not result in available
 4 information. Please provide a working link to the hearing documents for
 5 each proceeding cited above and any other appropriate references not
 6 cited.

7 **RESPONSE:**

8 The working links are as follows:

9 **AltaGas**

10 The Alberta Utilities Commission, *Decision 2014-139: AltaGas Utilities Inc. 2013-2017*
 11 *Performance-Based Regulation – Phase II Negotiated Settlement* (May 23, 2014), page
 12 17. Accessible
 13 online: <http://www.auc.ab.ca/applications/decisions/Decisions/2014/2014-139.pdf>

14

15 ATCO

16 Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, *Decision 2006-062: ATCO Gas 2003-2004 General*
17 *Rate Application Phase II Part 1 – 2003-2004 Final Rates* (June 27, 2006), page 3.
18 Accessible online: [http://www.auc.ab.ca/applications/decisions/Decisions/2006/2006-](http://www.auc.ab.ca/applications/decisions/Decisions/2006/2006-062.pdf)
19 [062.pdf](http://www.auc.ab.ca/applications/decisions/Decisions/2006/2006-062.pdf)

20 Union Gas

21 Ontario Energy Board, *Decision and Order EB-2011-0210: Union Gas Limited*, (October
22 25, 2012), page 81. Accessible
23 online: [http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/](http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/369836/view/)
24 [369836/view/](http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/369836/view/)

25 Enbridge

26 OEB EB-2012-0459, Exhibit G2, Tab 1, Schedule 1, page 3 of 27. PDF page 6 of the
27 document. Accessible
28 online: [http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/](http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/401940/view/)
29 [401940/view/](http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/401940/view/)

30 Centra Gas

31 Centra Gas Manitoba Inc., *2013/14 General Rate Application: Status of Public Utilities*
32 *Board Directives to Centra Gas Manitoba Inc., Appendix 15.2* (February 22, 2013), page
33 2. Accessible
34 online: http://www.pubmanitoba.ca/v1/centra_2013_14_gra/pdf/appendix_15_2.pdf

35 SaskEnergy

36 Specific reference is no longer available, however the same data can be accessed
37 under: SaskEnergy Incorporated, *Commodity and Deliver Service Rate Application*
38 (November 1, 2016), page 29. Accessible
39 online: [http://www.saskratereview.ca/docs/saskenergy2016/saskenergy-2016-](http://www.saskratereview.ca/docs/saskenergy2016/saskenergy-2016-commodity-and-delivery-service-rate-application.pdf)
40 [commodity-and-delivery-service-rate-application.pdf](http://www.saskratereview.ca/docs/saskenergy2016/saskenergy-2016-commodity-and-delivery-service-rate-application.pdf)

1 31.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 34

2 For example, if the range of acceptable R:C ratios in a jurisdiction is between
3 0.90 and 1.10 and customer class A has a ratio of 0.91 and customer class B
4 has a ratio of 1.11, rebalancing in order to bring the ratios to within the
5 acceptable range would require that the R:C ratio for customer class B be
6 reduced to 1.10 and customer class A would have to have its rates increased to
7 absorb the reduction in revenues from customer class B, probably resulting in a
8 ratio for customer class A that would be higher than 0.91. There is no
9 requirement to bring the R:C ratios for either customer class to be equal to 1.00.

10 Rebalancing is done to bring all customer classes within the accepted range of
11 R:C ratios. Any resulting shortfall in revenue requirement resulting from reducing
12 rates to customer classes that have R:C ratios that are above the upper end of
13 the accepted range, would be recovered from customer classes that have R:C
14 ratios below 1.00 and/or that have the lowest R:C ratios. The exact steps used to
15 rebalance rates vary across jurisdictions with no approach being analytically
16 superior to any other. The preferred methodology is a matter of judgement.

17 31.1 Please provide the Fortis BC Rate Rebalancing and Rate Design
18 presentation
19 at [http://www.fortisbc.com/About/RegulatoryAffairs/ElecUtility/Documents/
20 RDA%20Open%20House%20presentation%20July%2026%20final.pdf](http://www.fortisbc.com/About/RegulatoryAffairs/ElecUtility/Documents/RDA%20Open%20House%20presentation%20July%2026%20final.pdf)

21 31.1.1 Please confirm that the above presentation is a FortisBC
22 presentation for a Public Open House.

23 RESPONSE:

24 The first slide of the presentation read as a "Public Open House" event in July 2009. It is
25 FortisBC's responsibility to confirm the purpose of the presentation.

1 **31.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 34**

2 For example, if the range of acceptable R:C ratios in a jurisdiction is between
3 0.90 and 1.10 and customer class A has a ratio of 0.91 and customer class B
4 has a ratio of 1.11, rebalancing in order to bring the ratios to within the
5 acceptable range would require that the R:C ratio for customer class B be
6 reduced to 1.10 and customer class A would have to have its rates increased to
7 absorb the reduction in revenues from customer class B, probably resulting in a
8 ratio for customer class A that would be higher than 0.91. There is no
9 requirement to bring the R:C ratios for either customer class to be equal to 1.00.

10 Rebalancing is done to bring all customer classes within the accepted range of
11 R:C ratios. Any resulting shortfall in revenue requirement resulting from reducing
12 rates to customer classes that have R:C ratios that are above the upper end of
13 the accepted range, would be recovered from customer classes that have R:C
14 ratios below 1.00 and/or that have the lowest R:C ratios. The exact steps used to
15 rebalance rates vary across jurisdictions with no approach being analytically
16 superior to any other. The preferred methodology is a matter of judgement.

17 31.2 Please provide the FortisBC Inc. 2009 Rate Design and Cost of Service
18 Analysis Decision
19 at [http://www.ordersdecisions.bcuc.com/bcuc/decisions/en/111613/1/docu](http://www.ordersdecisions.bcuc.com/bcuc/decisions/en/111613/1/document.do)
20 [ment.do](http://www.ordersdecisions.bcuc.com/bcuc/decisions/en/111613/1/document.do)

21 31.2.1 Please confirm that the above Decision is a BCUC decision for
22 FortisBC Rate Design and Cost of Service.

23 **RESPONSE:**

24 The Decision is a BCUC decision for 2009 FortisBC Rate Design Application for the
25 determination of FortisBC electricity rates.

1 **32.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 40 and page 41**

2 10.1 CRISIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN BC

3 The Ministry of Social Development and Social Innovations (the Ministry)
4 runs crisis assistance programs that are designed to help low income
5 customers. Under the Essential Utilities Supplement Program, a crisis
6 supplement for essential utilities may be provided if recipients have
7 reached their monthly or annual limit for crisis supplements, exhausted all
8 resources, and do not have the ability to maintain essential utilities for
9 their home when served with a disconnection notice or faced with the
10 inability to re-establish essential utilities. The essential utilities supplement
11 counts towards a recipient's cumulative annual limit for crisis supplements.
12 Another program administered under the Ministry's supervision is the
13 Utility Security Deposit program under which a supplement may be
14 provided to assist recipients of income, hardship, and disability assistance
15 with the cost of securing service for electricity or natural gas.

16 32.1 Please provide the level of assistance that is available through the Ministry
17 of Social Development and Social Innovations under the Essential Utilities
18 Supplement Program.

19 **RESPONSE:**

20 The Essential Utilities Supplement Program counts towards a recipient's cumulative
21 annual limit for crisis supplements. The total cumulative amount of crisis supplements
22 that a recipient or dependant may receive over any 12 consecutive months must not
23 exceed twice the maximum amount of support and shelter that would be available to the
24 family at the time the request is made.¹

¹ <http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/policies-for-government/bcea-policy-and-procedure-manual/general-supplements-and-programs/crisis-supplement>

1 **33.0 Reference: Exhibit A2-10 page 41**

2 In Alberta, an one-time financial assistance to low income individuals or families
3 facing utility disconnection is provided by Alberta Works/Alberta Supports or
4 Canadian Red Cross. For Manitobans, the Employment and Income Assistance
5 Program (EIA) provide low-income consumers help with their utility costs.

6 33.1 Would Canadians Red Cross assistance likely be available in BC as well?
7 Please explain.

8 **RESPONSE:**

9 The Community Housing Support Program provided by Canadian Red Cross is
10 available in Calgary only.¹

¹ <https://ucahelps.alberta.ca/financial-assistance.aspx>